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Whether beauty is in the eye of the beholder or shared among individuals is a
longstanding question in empirical aesthetics. By decomposing the variance structure
of data for facial attractiveness, it has been previously shown that beauty evaluations
comprise a similar amount of private and shared taste (Hönekopp, 2006). Employing the
same methods, we found that, for abstract artworks, components that vary between
individuals and relate to personal taste are particularly strong. Moreover, we instructed
half of our participants to disregard their own taste and judge stimuli according to the
taste of others instead. Ninety-five women rated 100 abstract artworks for liking and
100 faces for attractiveness. We found that the private taste proportion was much
higher in abstract artworks, accounting for 75% of taste compared to 40% in the face
condition. Abstract artworks were also less affected than faces by the instruction to rate
according to others’ taste and therefore less susceptible to incorporation of external
beauty standards. Together, our findings support the notion that art—and especially
abstract art—crystallizes private taste.
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INTRODUCTION
There is increasing awareness that beauty is a powerful aspect of our visual world. Beauty attracts
and binds attention (Leder et al., 2010), plays a large role in decisions regarding object design
(Hekkert and Leder, 2008), and is pervasive in mating and social interactions (Rhodes, 2006).
However, there is still a debate whether the experience of beauty is grounded in certain objective
features or whether it is a more subjective process (Leder and Nadal, 2014). If the experience
of beauty is driven by objective features, we would expect high agreement between persons and
therefore a high amount of shared taste. If it is the result of a subjective, idiosyncratic history of
individual experiences, we would expect rather little agreement between persons, and therefore a
high amount of private taste. As in many other discussions, neither perspective seems to be entirely
true or false. Evidence of common features influencing the beauty of faces (Langlois and Roggman,
1990; Rhodes, 2006), abstract patterns (Jacobsen and Höfel, 2003; Gartus and Leder, 2013), or
object designs (Hekkert and Leder, 2008) indicates shared taste to at least some extent. On the
other hand, it is also recognized that people have diverging tastes in everyday aesthetic decisions.
If beauty indeed reflects a combination of private and shared taste components, can we
put their relative impact in numbers? Hönekopp (2006) introduced an approach where he
estimated the relative proportion of private and shared taste by estimating variance components
for facial attractiveness judgments (for a more detailed description of his approach, see below).
He found that shared and private taste equally contributed to beauty judgments of faces.
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The evaluation of facial beauty might show a particularly high
amount of shared taste because of its evolutionary origin and
the pervasiveness of faces in our environment. We are highly
familiar with looking at faces and highly sensitive to implicitly
and explicitly judging their attractiveness. This experience in
judging faces may make people ‘‘experts’’ regarding their own
taste. In the arts, and especially in the abstract arts, this is not the
case. Even art experts are usually not that pervasively exposed to
artworks as we all are exposed to faces. Moreover, the perception
and evaluation of facial attractiveness is considered to fulfill
biological functions (Little et al., 2011), reflecting several hard-
wired mechanisms that contribute to a coherent norm of facial
attractiveness (Rhodes, 2006; Swami and Furnham, 2008).
However, regarding the nature of the aesthetic sense, there
are many objects for which such an expertise or biologically
determined norm can be doubted. For other object categories, the
proportions of private and shared components might therefore
be different. Especially in the domain of art, individuality
and taste are considered particularly important (Leder et al.,
2004; Leder and Nadal, 2014). It is a widely held belief that
art production and appreciation is not typically governed by
universal rules, and consequently aesthetic preferences in the
domain of art have been discussed as being highly individual.
Leder et al. (2012) argued: ‘‘there is hardly any aspect of our
everyday perception that seems more subjective than the human
appreciation of art. People differ in the type of art that they
prefer’’ (p. 1).
Regarding the coherence of aesthetic evaluations, Vessel
et al. (2014) found lower observer agreement for images of
artworks and architecture as compared to landscapes and
faces. They assumed that preferences for artifacts such as
artworks rely on more personalized attributes because of their
reduced behavioral relevance and fewer basic-level distinctions
(also see Leder et al., 2012). Although it has been argued
in art history that abstract art might constitute a universally
understandable visual language (Haftmann, 1959), empirical
evidence supports the opposite: visual exploration is less coherent
and aesthetic evaluations are less similar across observers
for abstract as compared to representational art (Brinkmann
et al., 2014; Schepman et al., 2015). This difference might
be due to more converging associations and more assigned
meaning in representational than in abstract art (Schepman
et al., 2015). Vessel and Rubin (2010) also argued that for
abstract artworks, appreciation might be the result of internal,
subjective factors shaped by the viewer’s personal experience.
As shared preferences for certain types of artworks have been
found to be driven by shared semantic interpretations (Vessel
and Rubin, 2010), abstract artworks offer an intriguing research
challenge due to their lack of meaningful semantic content,
making them objects that can be differentiated only by their
style of depiction. Conceptual ideas, stylistic reflections, and
variations also are not readily apparent (Leder et al., 2004),
making meaning extraction a greater challenge (Belke et al.,
2006; Jakesch and Leder, 2009). All this explains the rather
low observer agreement in preference, possibly due to this
larger need—but also openness—for interpretation. Applying the
method of Hönekopp (2006) allows us to add empirical evidence
to the debate about private vs. shared taste in evaluating beauty
in abstract artworks compared with faces. Thus, we can directly
test whether and to what extent private taste drives the aesthetic
evaluation in abstract art.
Moreover, we do not simply assume that evaluation of
abstract art is marked by a high proportion of private taste.
If abstract art represents a class of objects for which private,
individual taste is primarily considered, a common standard
might not exist. We indirectly tested this by showing that
when participants are instructed to disregard or tune out their
own taste and acknowledge the taste of others, the effects
are weaker for abstract art than for faces. Therefore, apart
from the default evaluation based on one’s own taste—‘‘How
much do I like it?’’—we asked half of our participants
to consider the taste of others for their evaluation—‘‘How
much do others like it?’’. This evaluation, we argue, requires
taking the perspective and incorporating the taste of others.
Thus, in order to do so, people need to consider a norm
regarding what generally is liked or considered attractive (i.e.,
a beauty standard). For faces, people might be well aware
of features that determine such standards, such as smooth
skin, youth, or averageness (Langlois and Roggman, 1990;
e.g., Fink et al., 2001; Little and Perrett, 2002; Penton-Voak
et al., 2003). For abstract artworks on the other hand, such
standards might be much weaker, or even nonexistent. When
we assume that art evaluations are highly individual, it should
be much more difficult to take the perspective of others.
We therefore hypothesize that the instruction to evaluate
according to the taste of others increases the shared taste
proportion for faces, but does so to a lesser extent for abstract
artworks.
To measure the contribution of private and shared
components of taste, Hönekopp (2006) introduced a method
borrowed from generalizability theory (Shavelson and Webb,
1991; Brennan, 2001). By estimating variance components, this
method allows testing the suitability of a particular measure
for testing a specific effect. Variance components can then be
interpreted as observed variance attributed to the measurement
objects (tests) and to the facets of the measurement (items,
session). This approach can be applied to participants rating
any stimuli, such that the participants are the ‘‘tests’’ and the
stimuli are the ‘‘items’’. For decomposing the variance into its
components, participants need to rate the attractiveness of a
series of stimuli (e.g., faces) twice. The repeated measure is
necessary to separate the critical components from the residual.
The ratings are then taken to estimate variance components for
the rater (also called judge, varcompJ), the stimulus (varcompS),
and the judge × stimulus interaction (varcompJ×S). The
more the judges agree, the more variance can be explained
by the stimuli and the higher the variance component for a
stimulus. Shared taste is therefore reflected in varcompS. The
variance component for the interaction is an indicator of how
much the stimuli scores depend on the judge. Private taste is
therefore reflected in varcompJ×S. The variance component
for judges (varcompJ), however, indicates a general difference
between judges. We can either assume that this difference
reflects a meaningless difference in scale use, or that it reflects
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience | www.frontiersin.org 2 April 2016 | Volume 10 | Article 155
Leder et al. Private and Shared Taste in Art and Faces
additional variation for private taste. For both assumptions,
Hönekopp (2006) provided beholder indices (bi1 and bi2)
that measure the relative amount of private taste compared
to shared taste. Assuming that varcompJ is meaningless,
bi1 is computed as varcompJ×S/(varcompJ×S + varcompS).
Assuming that varcompJ reflects meaningful variation, bi2 is
computed as (varcompJ×S + varcompJ)/(varcompJ×S + varcompS
+ varcompJ).
Following our main hypothesis, for abstract artworks we
expect that private taste explains more variance than shared
taste. In numerical terms, bi should be rather high (or at least
above 50%), with the variance component for the judge and
artwork interaction explaining the most meaningful variance.
For faces—following Hönekopp (2006)—we expect an equal
proportion of private and shared taste. When participants are
instructed to rate according to the taste of others, for abstract
artworks we expect only a small decrease in private taste. For
faces, we expect a stronger decrease in private taste, because
presumably more common standards are available for rating
faces compared to rating abstract artworks.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Ninety-five heterosexual (self-reported) women between the ages
of 19 and 33 years (M = 22.7, SD = 2.9) took part in the
experiment. In order to keep the experimental design simple, we
only tested female participants and presented them only with
male faces. Most participants were undergraduate psychology
students from the University of Vienna, who fulfilled curriculum
requirements or earned extra course credit by participating.
All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision
(tested prior to the experiment). As art expertise can affect the
interpretation and the appreciation of abstract art (Furnham
and Walker, 2001; Belke et al., 2006; Leder et al., 2012), we
measured art expertise by a self-developed short questionnaire
containing knowledge questions about art-facts and artworks;
with an average of 34.8% of correct answers (max. 67.6%).
Based on our previous use with this scale, we thus considered
all participants as non-art experts and included them in our
analysis. Prior to the experiment, all participants gave written
consent and were informed that participation and data collection
were fully anonymous. Participants could withdraw at any time
during the experiment without any further consequences. All
studies were conducted in accordance with the Declaration
of Helsinki (revised, 1983) and the guidelines of the Faculty
of Psychology, University of Vienna. We further followed the
Austrian Universities Act, 2002 (UG2002)—which was active at
the time of the experiments—and which required only medical
universities to appoint ethics committees for clinical testing,
application of medical methods and applied medical research.
Therefore, no additional ethical approval was sought.
Materials
The estimation of bi depends on the distribution of the
dependent variable in the sample of images. Hönekopp (2006)
argued that in a homogeneous distribution, the impact of private
taste could be overestimated. Therefore, we ran pre-studies to
select a set of stimuli that showed a relatively heterogeneous
distribution in its affective value.
We collected 125 images of abstract paintings from online-
databases, such as Prometheus and Saatchi. Images were re-sized
so that the longer side equaled 700 pixels, while keeping the
original proportions. In a pre-study, 27 participants (17 females)
then rated each artwork for liking and valence. Based on
the results, images were subsequently split into four groups,
combining high/low valence with high/low liking, with 25
artworks selected from each group for use in the main study.
Because previous exposure to an artwork has been shown to
systematically affect rating (Leder, 2001; Leder et al., 2004), we
also ensured in an additional pre-study (N = 10) that the selected
artworks were largely unknown to laypersons (M = 1.43, SD
= 0.57, measured on a seven-point scale, with one completely
unknown to seven well known).
For the face stimuli, 143 males Caucasian faces were collected
from previous studies (n = 80, Schacht et al., 2008; Langner et al.,
2010), as well as from Google Images (n = 63). We edited each
image so that the face covered two-thirds of the image in front
of a gray background. The age of the faces was in the same
range as the age of our participants. Each face showed a relatively
neutral expression and was depicted in frontal view, free from
occlusions. Where applicable, we used Photoshop (CS2, Version
9.0) to make the additional images from Google similar to the
images by Schacht et al. (2008). As inHönekopp (2006), we scaled
all pictures down to a size of 413 × 537 pixels. In a pre-test, 38
females undergraduates rated the attractiveness of all faces. We
then split the sample by the median and selected 50 images of
each group for themain study. Thus, for both, artworks and faces,
we presented 100 images each.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to an ‘‘own taste’’ or an
‘‘others’ taste’’ group. In the own taste group, participants were
instructed to rate the attractiveness of the faces and the liking
of the artworks according to their own, individual taste (‘‘It is
very important that you rate the pictures/faces based on your
PERSONAL TASTE.’’). In the others’ taste group, participants
were instructed to rate the stimuli as they would be judged by
others (‘‘Do NOT rate the pictures/faces based on your personal
taste, but based on what you think OTHERS in general would
like/find attractive.’’).
We presented the artworks and the faces in two subsequent
blocks, with the order counterbalanced across participants. The
procedure in each block was identical to Hönekopp (2006): in
a first series, each artwork/face was randomly presented for
2 s, to allow the participants to form an internal standard
for scale use. In a second series, each artwork/face was
presented for 5 s and rated on a 7-point Likert-scale. For
the artworks, participants were asked ‘‘How much do you
like the picture?’’ in the own taste group and ‘‘How much
is the picture liked in general?’’ in the others’ taste group.
For the faces, participants were asked ‘‘How attractive do you
find the face?’’ in the own taste group and ‘‘How attractive
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is the face in general?’’ in the others’ taste group. A fixation
cross was shown for 500 ms between each stimulus during the
rating series. One week later, participants returned for a second
rating session with the same procedure employed as in the first
session.
RESULTS
Private vs. Shared Taste
We ran four separate linear random effects models fitted by
restricted maximum likelihood (REML) for both groups (own
taste and others’ taste) and both stimulus categories (artworks
and faces). All analyses were conducted with R (Version
3.1.0, R Development Core Team, 2014) using lme4 (Version
1.1–8, Bates et al., 2015). In addition to the random effects
model in R, we ran variance component analysis with SPSS,
using either REML or ANOVA Type III as methods (see
Hönekopp, 2006). All analyses yielded nearly the same variance
components and identical bis. For this reason, we did not
report them separately. As in Hönekopp (2006), we included
random intercepts for judges, stimuli, time, and all two-way-
interactions. Judges represent the participants, stimuli either
the artworks or the faces, and time represents the time of
testing (first or second session). The variance components and
the bis for both groups and stimulus categories are reported
in Table 1. Although methods for calculating standard errors
and confidence intervals for variance components exist (e.g.,
Burdick and Graybill, 1992), variance components are usually
not normally distributed; thus, ‘‘summarizing the precision of a
variance component estimate by giving an approximate standard
error is woefully inadequate’’ (Bates, 2010, p. 19). For this reason,
we abstained from reporting standard errors or confidence
intervals for the estimated variance components. This means
that testing for the significance of bis or of the difference
between bis is inadequate; therefore, we refrained from doing
so.
As indicated in the table, for artworks bis were much higher
than for faces. While for artworks, private taste accounted for
the major part of the variance (around 73.5% of variance), for
faces, shared taste accounted for the major part (around 65%
of variance). Moreover, for both stimuli categories, the bis were
higher in the own taste group than in the others’ taste group
(see bottom of Table 1). As shown in the bottom two rows
of Table 1, bi2 is consistently higher than bi1. The index bi2
includes rating differences among participants in the calculation,
assuming that this difference adds additional information for
private taste. This increase is similar to Hönekopp (2006), but
slightly more pronounced for faces than for artworks.
Group Differences
Figure 1 shows the correlation in the ratings between the others’
taste group and the own taste group (shown separately for each
artwork, in blue, and for each face, in red). For both faces
and artworks, ratings in the others’ taste group were generally
higher than ratings in the own taste group (Artworks: M = 3.89,
SD = 0.56; compared to, M = 3.18, SD = 0.64, t(93) = 5.72,
p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 1.18; Faces: M = 3.79, SD = 0.49;
compared to, M = 2.97, SD = 0.53, t(93) = 7.84, p < 0.001,
Cohen’s d = 1.61). In the figure this is indicated by nearly all
dots being to the left of the black dashed line, which represents
a perfect correlation. Figure 1 also indicates that faces showed
a more homogeneous and systematic increase than artworks.
The regression line for faces (in red) is nearly parallel to the
black dashed line, whereas the regression line for artworks (in
blue) is shallower. This means that for each single face similar
differences between own and others’ taste were found. However,
some artworks showed no change or even an opposite pattern.
This difference between both object categories is also reflected in
a higher correlation between the own taste and the others’ taste
group for faces (r = 0.98, p < 0.001) than for artworks (r = 0.64,
p< 0.001).
Reliability
Cronbach’s alpha is often used as an indicator for the reliability
of ratings, with high indicating strong agreement and a high
amount of shared taste. However, because reliability is a function
TABLE 1 | Estimated variance components and beholder indices (bi) for artworks and faces in both groups (own and others’ taste).
Artworks Faces
Own taste Others’ taste Own taste Others’ taste
Source of variation Estimated variance component (% of total variance)
Stimulus 0.460 (15.9%) 0.453 (17.9%) 1.179 (44.7%) 1.432 (50.7%)
Judge × Stimulus 1.342 (46.5%) 0.967 (38.2%) 0.677 (25.7%) 0.543 (19.2%)
Judge 0.380 (13.2%) 0.273 (10.8%) 0.260 (9.9%) 0.173 (6.1%)
Session 0.011 (0.4%) 0.005 (0.2%) 0.008 (0.3%) 0.008 (0.3%)
Session × Judge 0.034 (1.2%) 0.049 (1.9%) 0.030 (1.1%) 0.116 (4.1%)
Session × Stimulus 0.006 (0.2%) 0.000 (0.0%) 0.002 (0.1%) 0.000 (0.0%)
Error 0.653 (22.6%) 0.789 (31.1%) 0.480 (18.2%) 0.553 (19.6%)
Beholder indices (bi)
bi1 0.74 0.68 0.36 0.27
bi2 0.79 0.73 0.44 0.33
Note. bi1 = beholder index under the assumption that judge-score differences are meaningless. bi2 = beholder index under the assumption that judge-score differences
are meaningful.
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FIGURE 1 | Relation of the liking/attractiveness ratings between the
own taste and the others’ taste group, plotted separately for artworks
(blue) and faces (red). The dashed, black line represents a perfect
correlation with no difference between both groups. Dots left of this line
represent artworks/faces which have been rated higher in the others’ taste
group than in the own taste group. Dots right of this line represent
artworks/faces which have been rated higher in the own taste group than in
the others’ taste group. The regression lines and the scatter-plots show that
both, artworks and faces, were generally rated higher in the others’ taste
group. Furthermore, faces show a higher correlation between the groups and
therefore a more consistent increase from own taste to others’ taste.
of the sample size, even a verymoderate agreement among judges
can lead to high alphas (Hönekopp, 2006). Thus, Cronbach’s
alpha may strongly overestimate the agreement and poorly
reflects the actual amount of shared taste. Nonetheless, for the
sake of completeness, Cronbach’s alphas, inter-judge agreement,
and re-test reliability were also calculated for the data. As
expected, for both groups and for both sessions, the reliability of
the stimuli scores for artworks was Cronbach’s αs = 0.92, and for
faces, Cronbach’s αs > 0.98. The average inter-judge agreement
for faces was, rs = 0.48–0.58, and for artworks, rs = 0.19–0.21. The
re-test reliability was, on average, r = 0.80, for faces and, r = 0.71,
for artworks.
DISCUSSION
In the present study, we disentangled private from shared
proportions of taste when people judged abstract artworks
for liking and faces for attractiveness. Additionally, we tested
whether participants—when instructed to do so—can detach
their own taste for a stimulus and evaluate the taste of others
instead. Our analyses show two main results: first, proportions of
private taste were much higher in abstract artworks than in faces,
accounting for about 75% of taste in abstract artworks compared
to 40% in faces. Second, as expected, abstract artworks were less
affected by the instruction to rate the taste of others than faces
and therefore less susceptible to common beauty standards.
In line with our main hypothesis, private taste was
considerably higher for abstract artworks, explaining around 75%
of the total variance (bi1 = 0.74 and bi2 = 0.79). This finding
is contrary to the art historical belief that abstract art, due to
a lack of semantic content, is an universal expression of pure
emotion, experienced similarly across different perceivers (see
also Brinkmann et al., 2014). It seems, to the contrary, that
abstract art is not a universally understandable, or coherently
understood visual language (Haftmann, 1959). Even when
confronted with abstract combinations of certain colors or
shapes—for which the preference should be largely shared if
these are truly aesthetic primitives (see Palmer et al., 2013,
for an overview)—individuals differ in their evaluations. Even
though the presented paintings showed no discernible objects,
where individuals might differ in whether they like them or
not, abstract artworks still offer opportunities for subjective
interpretation. It is possible, that abstraction and lack of
semantics simply do not lead to similar experiences and thus to
similar preferences. They rather invite individuals to relate the
abstract content to vastly different, personal interpretations, and
thus to different experiences and preferences. In other words,
a depiction of a landscape might be liked by one participant,
but disliked by another, but in both cases, experiences about
landscapes are triggered. However, a Jackson Pollock painting
might remind one participant about his/her untidy desk,
whereas it reminds another about his/her untidy lifestyle. Thus,
abstract art might invite divergent interpretations (Leder et al.,
2004).
In faces on the other hand, the proportion of private taste was
much smaller, accounting for only about 40% of the meaningful
variance (bi1 = 0.36, bi2 = 0.44). Those values are comparable to
previous results for women judging men (bi1 = 0.37, bi2 = 0.53;
Hönekopp, 2006, p. 205).
We further addressed the question of whether the proportion
of shared taste can be increased by explicitly instructing half of
our participants to evaluate the stimuli according to how they
think others would judge them. Thereby, shared taste increased
for both object categories, but is was more pronounced for faces
(around 10%) as compared to abstract artworks (6%). On first
glance, the additional 6% suggest that participants somehow
managed to find at least some beauty standard for abstract
artworks. However, the artworks themselves only explained an
additional 2% of variance, while the remaining variance gain was
due to a much higher error component than in the own taste
group. We therefore argue that the others’ taste instruction
did not considerably influence evaluations. The findings rather
indicate that participants have a weak representation of the
taste of others for abstract artworks. This can be interpreted in
at least two ways: first, the liking of abstract art simply may
not have a great amount of shared components, thus these
components in others also cannot be inferred. This is also
indicated by the low amount of shared taste that we found for
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abstract artworks (around 25%). The lack of such standards
consequently leaves room for stronger private taste, for example
personal dislike of certain colors or different associations as
argued above. Second, perhaps our participants were not able
to infer the shared components, due to the lack of expertise,
or experience in knowing about other peoples’ taste for art. In
the domain of facial beauty, standards might be much more
obvious through media and interpersonal exchange on the
topic. The role of expertise could be addressed by testing art
experts on abstract art in a similar study design. However, in
the study by Brinkmann et al. (2014), when the similarity of
gaze patterns was tested, art expertise did not influence the
findings.
Regarding facial attractiveness, the decrease of private taste
in the shared taste group was more substantial, even though the
shared component was already at a higher level. The variance
component of the face explained an additional 6% in the
others’ taste group as compared to the own taste group. Thus,
participants apparently adopted a beauty standard in judging
facial attractiveness: they have a certain representation about the
taste of others. This finding therefore suggests that our sense of
beauty can be part of our understanding of a theory of mind
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Interestingly, for both object categories we found that when
taking the perspective of others, participants also systematically
gave higher ratings than participants in the own taste group.
Thus, they were less inclined to respond that others disliked an
abstract artwork or face. This effect might be grounded in the
participants’ concepts of the others. By rating the taste of others,
they might have referred to a social group (out-group) different
from their own peer group (undergraduate students). This could
have resulted in false uniqueness. That is, individuals may have
believed themselves to be more individual (in our case more
critical) than the norm (Hoorens, 1993). Additionally, this effect
might be explained by a selective misattribution. Participants
might have attributed perceptual features of abstract artworks
or faces, and which they did not like, to their private taste,
while they attributed features which they did like to shared
taste. Moreover, abstract artworks showed a less systematic
increase than faces when taking the perspective of others. The
more systematic increase in faces might be an indicator of
strong representations of beauty standards for faces. In abstract
artworks however, the lower correlation and the less systematic
pattern hint at much weaker standards of what is commonly seen
as beautiful.
Despite the clear difference between the amount of private
and shared taste between abstract artworks and faces, the findings
are not without limitations. First, up to now, there have been
unfortunately no meaningful statistical method available to
compute whether the differences in beholder indices between
both object categories are significant or not (Bates, 2010).
Thus, it is also not fully clear whether the differences between
the own and others’ taste groups are substantial or within
the margins of measurement error. However, given that we
could replicate the findings of Hönekopp (2006) with faces,
we are confident that the proportions of private and shared
taste represent a stable effect. Nonetheless, we hope for future
developments in statistical modeling that allow us to corroborate
our findings.
By using only unknown faces/artworks, we do not know
how famous artworks or faces would affect the proportion of
private and shared taste. It seems plausible that the shared taste
component would be higher for famous stimuli. However, in
faces, factors such as fame or infamy, which might lead to well-
known faces but evoke differing responses tied to individual’s
own ideas about these concepts, might render the relationship
more complex that it seems at first glance. This would be an
interesting avenue for further research.
Furthermore, the results of our study are limited to female
participants and we did not include any personality traits,
which could have influenced the results. For example, for
artworks, art expertise might have an effect (Augustin and Leder,
2006; Leder et al., 2012). For faces, factors like sociosexual
orientation or relationship status might play a role (Simpson
and Gangestad, 1991), in that people with high mate-search
motivation not only might assign higher values of attractiveness,
but might also show more individual patterns and thus lower
the level of coherence. Nonetheless, given the complexity of
the design when additional interactions between the gender of
the participant and the gender of the stimulus face are tested,
and given the weak impact of gender in the previous study by
Hönekopp (2006), we opted for only testing female participants.
Furthermore, to our knowledge, for abstract artworks there
is no strong indication that women differ from men in their
preference.
To sum up, we disentangled private from shared proportions
in preference for abstract artworks and faces. The private
proportion was much higher in abstract artworks than in
faces, accounting for about 75% of taste compared to 40%.
For the first time, we can add concrete and reliable numbers
to the debate of private vs. shared taste in art perception.
We also found that instructing the participants to rate the
images according to the taste of others increased shared
taste for faces, but less so for abstract artworks. These
findings are in accordance with the assumption that beauty
standards exist for faces, but much less so for abstract art.
Thus, preference for abstract art is indeed in the eye of the
beholder.
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